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not merely faith, but faith in reason as the condition of philosophical 'salvation.' In so far as the revolt against the recently dominant forms of Hegelianism means a return to a genuine theism and a real teleology I for one cannot but sympathize with it; only I would say, let us beware of the suggestion that the way to behold the 'Father of lights' lies through putting out the eye of the soul.

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RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX. By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc.
London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910. Pp. xxvii, 478.

This is a partially revised edition of a book which first appeared twenty years ago. In his preface Dr. Schiller explains and apologizes for republication; he was impelled, he says, by a sense of duty towards the public which demanded it. If the reader wants to know to what extent the revision represents Dr. Schiller's present views on metaphysical questions, his curiosity will remain unsatisfied. We are told, indeed, that "the central doctrines are essentially maintained and may be taken to attest the stability of the author's personality"; but it would be a mistake to suppose that when Dr. Schiller says that his central doctrines are maintained he means that he thinks them quite true. For he says: "I now wholly disbelieve in the possibility of framing a system that can . . . lay claim to absolute truth and certainty." We may take it, however, that he still attaches some value to his system over and above the fact that it proves his personality to be stable, for otherwise he would scarcely have felt it a duty to undergo the labor of revision. It is, therefore, incumbent on a reviewer to try to estimate its value.

The central positions which he wishes to establish seem to be as follows. The world can only be properly understood if we regard it as in process of evolution. And its evolution takes place in a finite period of time; *i. e.*, the world must have had a beginning and will have an end. The goal of this process, which will some day be reached, is a perfect society of perfect individuals. Further, evolution, thus understood, "proves irrefragably that no evolution was possible without a preëxistent Deity" (p. 197). And it can also be proved that God, who

is the first cause of the temporal process of evolution, is a person, is intelligent, and is finite. This conception of the universe is confirmed, Dr. Schiller thinks, by the first chapter of the book of Genesis (p. 416).

But when we try to fill in the details of the scheme insuperable difficulties arise. What precisely is the nature of the difference between the world as it was when it began and the world as it will be when it ends? We must distinguish, he says, between the 'phenomenally' and the 'ultimately' real; and neither matter nor our phenomenal selves (*i. e.*, our selves as they appear to us) are ultimately real. As to the Self, it is only the phenomenal self that is real now (p. 276); there is a Transcendental Ego which will be the sole reality when the goal of evolution is reached and the time-process ends. And similarly with matter, or the 'objective world'; it is not ultimately real, but has that kind of reality which may be expressed by saying that it has "some teleological significance." Whatever that may mean, it seems plain that both matter and our minds, though at present merely phenomenal, are to be conceived as having some sort of reality: both the psychical and the physical worlds are, he says, different aspects of the same fact. We nevertheless find that these two aspects are by no means on an equal footing. Spirit can be reduced to matter (p. 270); and the objective world in space and time "represents merely a state or condition of our minds" (p. 273), though whether of our phenomenal or of our transcendental selves we are not told. The reduction of matter to terms of spirit is as follows: Matter can be resolved into force, and force is spirit; the atom (or electron) which science postulates as the ultimate constituent of matter is finally defined as "a constant manifestation of divine force or will exercised at definite points" (p. 272). Moreover, there is no such thing as space as distinguished from the matter occupying it (p. 246), and space is 'subjective' (p. 254). These assertions seem inconsistent with the ascription to the physical world of any reality at any point of time. Yet his view of the world-process often seems to be that at the first moment of time, when evolution began, nothing was real except God and matter, and that as spirit is evolved matter grows less and less real, until the process ends with nothing being real except God and a harmony of perfect individual spirits. On the other hand, some of his views contradict this;

e. g., that in the 'pre-cosmic state' (*i. e.*, before time and evolution began) spirits existed in 'timeless solitude' (p. 414). Did they cease to exist when God created the world?

It would be tedious to set out in detail the inconsistencies involved in this theory; most of them seem capable of being traced to Dr. Schiller's failure to notice the ambiguity of the phrase 'ultimately real.' He is anxious to avoid the usual implication of this phrase, which is that the world, as it appears in space and time, is an illusion, and therefore he often uses 'ultimately real' in the sense of what will be real when the end of the world comes: to say that my mind is not ultimately real now does not mean that it is an illusion, but merely that it is different from what it will be some very large but finite number of years hence; *e. g.*, it is less highly evolved, less of a perfect individual than it will be then. But in his discussion of the phenomenal world he constantly slips back into the other meaning, according to which what is not ultimately real is mere hallucination. A good example of this confusion is his treatment of time. He is positive that the evolution of the world takes place in a time which is both real and finite; for a process must as such have a real beginning and a real end in time (p. 206). At the same time he holds that the notion of time is self-contradictory: this is in fact his only tangible reason for supposing that it will at some distant date be 'transcended by eternity' (p. 297). His solution of this contradiction consists in saying that time must be called 'a corruption of eternity.'

Apart from the question whether Dr. Schiller's theory is true, two points may be noticed as to the kind of arguments by which he supports it. In the first place, he frequently appeals to the contradictions supposed to be involved in the notion of infinity. Thus the positions that space and time are finite, that God exists (since an infinite regress of causes is impossible), that God is finite, that the world must have had a beginning, all depend largely on these contradictions, which, however, are never stated with even moderate precision. Dr. Schiller would have done well to revise his views in the light of the work of the mathematical logicians, who, since they claim to have shown that the notion of infinity involves no contradictions, have made precision in these matters more than ever necessary. As it is, a remark which he makes against Mr. Bradley may be retorted upon himself: such proofs are hazardous because the alleged con-

tradition may always be ascribed to "insufficient knowledge or inadequate conceptions" (p. 156). In the second place, many of his arguments consist of an appeal, more or less explicit, to passion or prejudice, which usually takes the form of accepting a belief on the ground of its pleasantness. Thus it is suggested that a conclusion may be rejected because it is "repugnant" or "does violence to our best instincts"; or another may be recommended as "satisfying our aspirations." This method of course is connected with the humanist theory of truth: "A truth may be as surely attested by feeling or will as by the most vigorous demonstration" (p. 264).

Finally, it seems necessary to say something about the general tone of Dr. Schiller's writing. He has a large audience outside professional circles, and consequently a great opportunity for securing for philosophy the respect of the plain man. Unfortunately, his style has qualities which must repel not merely the fastidious few, but any person of common sense. Instead of the sobriety and plainness which the subject requires, it is uniformly flabby and pretentious, and constantly disfigured by cheap flowers of sentimental rhetoric. I will quote two specimens: "It [agnosticism] calls up Scepticism from the abyss of negation, and is absorbed by a greater and more powerful spirit of evil. Scepticism, in its turn, can establish its case only by allying itself with Pessimism, and in Pessimism the last disguise is thrown off, and Chaos once more swallows up the Cosmos" (p. 14). "We can still see even now that the happiness that reflects is lost, that comparisons are odious, and creep into the soul upon the wings of the Harpy Doubt when it has sullied the unsuspecting transparency of its virgin feelings" (p. 421). These are models of what English ought not to be. Dr. Schiller says that he has toned down the book; but the process might have been carried much further. He will perhaps plead the exuberance of youth. The fact, however, is that the vices of his style seem to depend on a temper of mind that the years have not cured. The philosopher's passionate conviction of the truth of his doctrines and his desire to convert the world are among the noblest of emotions, provided that he avoids that strain of personal arrogance which, in the man of science, is generally recognized as unbecoming. And it is equally essential to avoid all taint of querulousness. Dr. Schiller's enthusiasm is spoiled by both these faults, which his style

faithfully reflects. There is a characteristic passage in his preface (p. vi) where he says that philosophers have "exaggerated the importance of their functions," and that in private they do not take their views seriously enough, thus accusing his fellow-workers in one breath of insignificance and dishonesty. This kind of self-conscious swagger is much to be deplored. I would not have made these remarks were it not that Dr. Schiller challenges such criticism by his view that metaphysics must be "intensely personal" (p. vii). There may be some sense in which this is true; but preoccupation with one's own personality may take such forms as to hamper the serious pursuit of truth.

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A BEGINNER'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: VOL. II. MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Herbert Ernest Cushman. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911. Pp. xx, 377.

The second volume of this text-book is not open to the most serious of the strictures passed upon the first (this JOURNAL, xxi, p. 352). It seems to be, to the degree in which that may be demanded in a text-book, a fresh and independent piece of work; and the author in some cases successfully realizes his announced purpose of relating the history of philosophy in an interesting and illuminating manner with the history of general literature and of affairs. The volume has one good quality which some better-written and more scholarly works lack: it keeps clearly before the student's mind the relative dates of the actual currency and influence of doctrines,—which are often quite distinct from the dates of publication of the treatises in which those doctrines are expressed. The movements and the sequence of intellectual fashions of the European mind are exhibited, as well as the succession of technical systems,—the two being, in a considerable measure, independent variables.

It is this above all which an elementary history of modern philosophy should do for its readers; and in at least attempting a sort of *Phänomenologie des occidentalischen Geistes* Professor Cushman has set a good example. Yet I cannot but think the book in certain important respects decidedly ill-adapted to the use of the class of readers for whom it is intended. In the first place, in a praiseworthy effort to bring out the broad outlines of the story, the author repeatedly propounds